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Overview
 Purpose: To tailor the use of TINA to various 
settings that correspond to different combinations 
of acquisition category, lifecycle stage, and 
contract type.
 Rationale: One size does not fit all.
 Approach: economics based, incentive centric.
 Policy Implications
Truth in Negotiations Act 
(TINA)
 TINA was first enacted in 1962 (Public Law87-653)
 TINA requires contractors (often sole-source or near 
sole-source) to submit “cost or pricing data” that is 
“current, complete, and accurate.”
 Failing to disclose truthful information could lead to civil 
or criminal investigation.
Economic Literature Review
 Principal-Agent Contract Setting
 DoD procurement is subject to two kinds of problems
• Adverse Selection (Hidden Information)
• Moral Hazard (Hidden Effort)
 Two objectives of optimal contracting: limit information 
rents earned by agent; induce the agent’s best effort.
Economic Literature Review 
(cont’d)
 Power of Incentive Schemes varies across the spectrum of 
contract types
• FFP: high power incentive scheme
• CPFF: low power incentive scheme
 The non-commitment nature of the government contracts 
naturally leads to contractors’ fears of being “ratcheted up” if 
they reveal their lowest possible cost.
 Cost Padding incurs excessive costs to the government, such 
as shifting overhead costs from commercial business to 
government contracts and engaging in various bookkeeping 
tricks to manipulate costs.
Economic Literature Review (cont’d): 
Wang et al. (2016): 
Distorted Incentives: Use of TINA with 
Firm Fixed Price (FFP) Contracts 
 Background: there is a current policy push toward more 
use of FFP contracts.
 FFP contracts without TINA, despite many 
weaknesses, are free of the moral hazard problem.
 FFP contracts, with TINA, lose the benefit of being a 
high power incentive scheme.
 “TINA cannot force defense contractors to reveal the 
lowest possible cost that they could produce at if they 
exerted an optimal effort. Rather, it essentially tells 
them that the price they negotiate must be close to the 
cost they actually incur.” ----Rogerson (1994)
Economic Literature Review (cont’d): 
Wang et al. (2016): 
Distorted Incentives: Use of TINA with 
Firm Fixed Price (FFP) Contracts 
(cont’d)
 Using the theoretical framework in Laffont and Tirole
(1993), Wang et al. established a simple numeric 
example to illustrate  that the otherwise absent moral 
hazard problem is created by imposing TINA in the FFP 
contracting setting. Sometimes even worse, in addition 
to moral hazard (i.e., shirking) problem, the 
enforcement of TINA also generates bad incentives for 
defense contractors to engage in unethical and 
opportunistic cost padding.
 Wang et.al. (2016) conclude that in the context of FFP 
contracts for major weapon programs, a lax use of 
TINA is preferred to a strict one.
Customizing the Use of 
TINA 
 This study extends (Wang et.al. 2016) to a broader scope and 
greater depth. In particular, we propose to customize the use (or 
disuse) of TINA in DoD for various contracting scenarios involving 
specific acquisition category (ACAT I through III), stage of the 
cycle (Milestones A, B, and C), and contract type. 
 The bottom line: we don’t believe TINA should be prescribed via 
a “one-size-fits-all” approach. TINA, at its current form, is 
essentially a blanket application with very limited exception. In 
particular, TINA application does not (at least not directly) vary 
with acquisition category, cycle stage, and contract type.
Figure 4: Typical Contract Types 
by Acquisition Phase
Table 3: Customizing the 
Use (Disuse) of TINA
 as the acquisition category descends from I to III, within the same life 
cycle stage (with the exception of the first and last stage), we 
gradually shift toward the contract type that allocates more risk to the 


















































 For the red-colored cells, i.e., ACAT I (MDAP) starting from Pre-Milestone C 
and continue through the rest of the acquisition cycle, we propose to do away with 
the use of TINA. The polar case here, that is, the use of FFP in the context of 
MDAP, is thoroughly analyzed by Wang et.al. (2016).
 It is worth noting that for ACAT I (MDAP), even at the very late stage of the 
acquisition cycle, due to the extreme complex technology and production process, 
significant information asymmetry nevertheless exist between the contractor and 
the DoD. Consequently, the unverifiable part of the production cost is still 
significant and there is plenty of room for contractors to shirk or engage in cost 
padding. 
 The other two red-colored cells, i.e., MDAP at Pre-Milestone C (Engineering & 
Manufacturing Development), and Post-Milestone C (Production and 
Deployment), adopt CPIF and FPIF, respectively. Both CPIF and FPIF belong to 
incentive contracts which are designed to induce cost-saving effort from 
contractors. To the extent that TINA exposes compliance risk to contractors in 
case of ex-post unfavorable cost variance, imposing TINA in these two cells 
would have similar unintended consequence as discussed in Wang et.al (2015), 
hence we recommend similar fix, i.e., the disuse of TINA.
Table 3 Analysis(cont’d)
 For the yellow-colored cells, we suggest no changes to the current TINA use. These cells include: 
1) ACAT III across all the life cycle stages. 
Modest information asymmetry between the DoD and the contractor. Therefore, the verifiability of the program cost is good. 
When most of the cost information is verifiable, TINA is an effective mechanism to deter defective pricing.
2)  ACAT II life cycle stages up to Pre-Milestone C
Under this category, CPIF and CPAF are prescribed for Pre-Milestone B and Pre-Milestone C, respectively. In general, 
cost-plus contracts inherently suffer from moral hazard problem.  Hence removing TINA does not make the problem go away. 
However, TINA does reduce the “defective pricing” incentive by imposing the litigation risk, at least for the verifiable part of the 
program cost. So the net benefit of “with TINA” minus “without TINA” is positive and we suggest a “stay-put” strategy.
For the cell that intersects ACAT II and Pre-Milestone A (Material Solution Analysis), the prescribed contract type is FFP, 
yet we suggest the use of TINA. This is in contrast to what we suggest for the polar case discussed in ACAT I. The major reason is 
that for Pre-Milestone A, which is a pre-system acquisition stage, most of the conceptual refinement work is performed through 
analogy or parametric estimating methods. To the extent that the estimation is based on similar existing item or mathematical
model, a big part of the cost is verifiable. As argued before, TINA is an effective way of deterring “defective pricing” when the cost 
information is verifiable.
3) ACAT I (MDAP) life cycle stages before Pre-Milestones B
For the same reason mentioned in the last paragraph, for the FFP contract used in Pre-Milestone A MDAP, we proposes to 
keep TINA in place. For the cell that intersects MDAP and Pre-Milestone B, TINA is also retained to mitigate the incentive of 
engaging in “defective pricing.” 
Table 3 Analysis(cont’d)
For the purple-colored cells, we recommend flexible use of TINA. Use or 
disuse of TINA should be dependent upon individual cases. On one hand, 
ACAT II, even at the last two stages of life cycle, should still demonstrate non-
trivial information asymmetry between the DoD and the contractor, therefore our 
worry about the contractor’s ill incentive under TINA and the related “moral 
hazard” problem remains. On the other hand, to the extent that ACAT II is much 
smaller and less complex than ACAT I (MDAP), the degree of information 
asymmetry should be much less severe than under MDAP. If the major part of 
the program cost is verifiable, then enforcing TINA can effectively prevent 
“defective pricing” from happening. Decision makers must run a horse-racing 
between the two offsetting factors and accordingly choose the use or disuse of 
TINA to maximize social welfare. For example, one can argue that if Technology 
Readiness Level (TRL) reaches 8 or above, then use of TINA is preferred. 
Conclusions
 One size does not fit all.
 In some settings where TINA is misplaced, we 
propose to drop TINA to remove the ill 
incentives and consequent unintended negative 
consequences. In other settings where TINA 
brings more benefit than cost, we recommend to 
keep TINA in place. In a few settings where the 
judgment is not unambiguous, we propose to 
leave the discretion to decision makers.
Additional Slides
Figure 2: Defense Acquisition Process
Figure 3: Risk and 
Contract Types
